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Abstract
Health shocks are among the most important unprotected risks for microfinance
clients, but the take-up of micro health insurance typically remains limited. This pa-
per attributes low enrollment rates to a social dilemma. Our theory is that in jointly
liable groups, insurance is a public good. Clients can rely on contributions from
group members to cope with shocks. Less risk averse clients have a private in-
centive to free-ride and forgo individual insurance even when insurance optimizes
group welfare. The binding nature of insurance offered at the group level eliminates
such free-riding. A framed public good experiment in Tanzania, eliciting demand
for group versus individual microinsurance, yields substantial support for this hy-
pothesis. This provides a potential explanation for low take-up rates.
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1 Introduction
Limited access to formal insurance induces the poor to share risk with other house-
holds (Townsend, 1994). Because these risk-pooling arrangements provide only
partial protection from shocks (Udry, 1994; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006), mi-
croinsurance schemes have the potential to enhance welfare. Enrollment never-
theless typically remains at low levels (see the programs described in for instance
De Allegri et al., 2009; Cole et al., 2013). We argue that this is precisely be-
cause insurance is offered to individual members of existing risk-sharing groups,
resulting in free-riding problems.
This study uses a framed laboratory experiment in Tanzania to analyze whether
the health insurance decision in microcredit groups entails a social dilemma. Ill-
nesses and injuries are among the most important unprotected risks in developing
countries (Gertler and Gruber, 2002) and health shocks are a major reason for in-
dividual default in microfinance. To reduce default rates, microcredit is typically
offered through group-based lending.1 Jointly liable clients can continue borrow-
ing only if the group loan is fully repaid. Thus, clients have dynamic incentives
to share risk and contribute for peers who cannot repay (Besley and Coate, 1995).
These contributions provide mutual insurance, but the insurance is incomplete
since the group will still default if too many members cannot repay.
Although incomplete, such existing risk-sharing arrangements can crowd out
formal insurance (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991). Using non-cooperative game theory,
we show that the decision to take individual health insurance in jointly liable credit
groups is subject to free-riding. Even when group welfare is highest if all members
enroll, less risk averse clients are tempted to forgo insurance, since fellow group
members contribute to their loan repayment in case they cannot repay themselves.
More risk averse clients are not tempted to free-ride.
It is not clear a priori whether our free-riding theorem holds empirically in mi-
crocredit groups for at least four reasons. First, microfinance groups are long-term
1Although several microfinance institutes including the Grameen Bank have moved to individual liability, group-
based lending is still the predominant way to bank the poor.
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relationships with repeated insurance decisions. The threat of future retaliation
may well induce cooperative behavior (Bo´, 2005). Second, microfinance institu-
tions teach their clients to be ‘good borrowers’ (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010),
which may shape social norms to enroll in insurance. Third, microfinance clients
meet regularly to repay their loans. Communication during these meetings may
help reinforce social norms and reduce free-riding (Sally, 1995). Fourth, existing
social ties may facilitate cooperation (Cassar, Crowley and Wydick, 2007).
We therefore test our free-riding hypothesis by means of a framed field ex-
periment (Harrison and List, 2004). In this experiment, 355 clients from a mi-
crofinance institution in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, played a public good game
resembling their decision-making context with joint liability. Depending on the
treatment, participants were offered insurance either at the individual level or at
the group level. Group insurance requires a unanimous decision to enroll. Be-
cause a vote against insurance bars all peers from insurance as well, this treatment
eliminates free-riding. If clients are willing to join group insurance, they perceive
full enrollment to be welfare-enhancing. Lower demand in the individual treat-
ment only among less risk averse clients, but not among more risk averse clients,
can be interpreted as free-riding.
The experimental findings provide substantial evidence of this theory. In the
group insurance treatment, nearly all participants opt for insurance, including
groups with less risk averse members. Under individual insurance, most clients
with high degrees of risk aversion enroll while a large number of less risk averse
clients forgo insurance. A significant share free-rides on contributions from their
more risk averse peers, and is even less likely to enroll in insurance when paired
with other less risk averse clients. This social dilemma provides an explanation
for low take-up of micro health insurance.
This study contributes to the existing literature in three distinctive ways. First,
the theoretical framework models limited commitment to explain why members
of social risk-sharing networks forgo microinsurance even when such insurance is
welfare-improving. Prior literature has focused mainly on the reverse effect that
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formal insurance might crowd out informal transfers (Attanasio and Rios-Rull,
2000), and on limited commitment to share risk in informal networks (Kocher-
lakota, 1996; Ligon, Thomas and Worrall, 2002). We show that risk-sharing can
distort private incentives to enroll in microinsurance.
Second, the experiment sheds light on the replicability of findings from con-
ventional public good games to the field. A large body of literature analyzes
social dilemmas in abstract laboratory experiments with university students. Our
microinsurance games mimic real-life decisions for a population that differs from
this usual participant in many respects (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008), in a con-
text where free-riding is not a trivial outcome. As such, the games extend the
experimental literature on strategic behavior in microcredit groups (e.g. Cassar,
Crowley and Wydick, 2007; Gine´ et al., 2010).
Third, the study offers a policy analysis of group insurance, highlighting a cru-
cial difference between individual and group insurance schemes that is currently
ignored in the literature. Group insurance does not only limit adverse selection,
but also eliminates free-riding and potentially enhances demand. This is relevant
for numerous microinsurance programs struggling to increase enrollment. Fur-
ther, group insurance enhances group welfare by reducing inequality between less
and more risk averse clients.
This study analyzes demand for insurance in a microfinance setting but the
findings generalize to alternative risk-sharing networks such as cooperatives or
informal saving groups. Independently, De Janvry, Dequiedt and Sadoulet (2012)
refer to free-riding problems to explain low take-up of rainfall insurance in coop-
eratives but they do not empirically test their hypotheses. Their proposition is that
free-riding occurs in the case of covariate shocks. Our theory may hence general-
ize to other commonly occurring shocks such as demand or weather shocks.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section models
the insurance decision in a jointly liable microcredit group and derives the free-
riding hypothesis. Section 3 introduces the framed field experiment designed to
test this theoretical prediction. Section 4 describes the study population, discusses
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the risk aversion measure, and tests whether participants’ characteristics are well
balanced across treatments. Section 5 analyzes whether the decision to take insur-
ance is subject to free-riding. Section 6 addresses policy implications. The final
section concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 The model
This section develops a model for the health insurance decision in jointly liable
microcredit groups. A group of n microcredit clients jointly borrows nl in every
loan cycle t ∈ {1, ...,∞}. Clients face idiosyncratic health risk. An ill client incurs
health expenditures and cannot repay her share of the group loan. Her fellow
group members (henceforth peers) contribute to loan repayment but the group
defaults if too many members fall ill. In that case, the group will not continue
to the next loan cycle. Clients can take insurance as a protection against health
expenditures, reducing the group default risk. Their insurance decisions resemble
a public goods game.
Figure 1 presents this game graphically. The left-hand block in the figure
indicates disposable income before contributing for ill peers, piit. A client invests
her loan l and earns piit = e net of loan repayment. Prior to repayment, she risks an
IID health shock that occurs every period with probability p and affects income
in the present loan cycle.2 Ill clients incur catastrophic health expenditures h ∈
(e, e + l] and repay l − (h − e). For these so-called delinquents, disposable income
is zero, piit = 0.
Before the realization of the health shock, clients have the option to enroll in
insurance, which fully covers health expenditures at an actuarially fair insurance
premium ph. Disposable income for an insured client is piit = e − ph irrespective
2The model focuses on health risks that are typically covered by microinsurance, i.e. major injuries and acute ill-
ness. It does not focus on adverse selection (heterogeneity in p), epidemics (cross-sectional correlation) or chronic illness
(serial correlation). Our theoretical results are robust to heterogeneous health risks for a wide range of parameters. The
homogeneity in health risk can also be interpreted as assortative matching on health status.
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of the health outcome, and earnings are sufficiently large to pay the premium,
e > ph. Indicating client i’s insurance status with dit, equal to one if she enrolls in
loan cycle t and zero otherwise, the number of insured group members is:
nIt ≡
n∑
i
dit
The right-hand block of Figure 1 indicates a client’s value after contributing
for delinquent peers. We define the random number of uninsured ill group mem-
bers, i.e. delinquents, as Ft. This variable follows a binomial distribution,
Ft ∼ B(p, n − nIt ),
where n − nIt is the number of uninsured group members.
In order to repay the full group loan and continue borrowing, the group needs
to jointly contribute h − e for each delinquent, so the total contribution in loan
cycle t is Ft(h − e). Define c(Ft, piit) as an individual’s contribution, depending
on the number of delinquents Ft and her disposable income piit. A client never
contributes more than her own income:
c(Ft, piit) ≤ piit
with piit = e − ph, piit = e and piit = 0 for insured, healthy uninsured and ill
uninsured clients, respectively. If Πt ≡ ∑ni piit indicates total income within the
group, a group can hence jointly contribute at most:
n∑
i
c(Ft, piit) ≤ Πt,
Clients however do not fully share the risk. If too many clients cannot repay their
share, the group is unable to repay the full loan, Ft(h − e) > Πt. The bank stops
lending from period t + 1 onwards, and clients derive zero value from future loan
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cycles. If the group is able to repay the loan, Πt ≥ Ft(h − e), repaying clients
jointly contribute Ft(h − e) and lending continues. Because earnings within a
round cannot be negative and have a positive expected value, continuation has a
strictly positive value for all clients.
Under such joint liability, the group repays the full loan and continues with
probability PnIt , defined as:
PnIt ≡ P
(
Ft(h − e) ≤ Πt|nIt
)
(1)
Insured clients can always repay their share of the loan, so if all n group mem-
bers take insurance, the group continues with certainty, Pn = 1.
The model presented above makes four key assumptions. The first assumption
reflects the stylized fact that total default on group loans is very uncommon in
microfinance.3 We therefore assume that in case of group default, clients repay as
much as they can, namely total disposable income from the present loan cycle,
Ft(h − e) > Πt ⇒ c(Ft, piit) = piit. (2)
A second assumption follows from the finding that clients generally contribute
for their delinquent peers, which is often attributed to the practice of conditioning
future access to microfinance on full group loan repayment. This creates dynamic
incentives to contribute in a cooperative Nash equilibrium (Besley and Coate,
1995). We therefore do not model a discretionary contribution decision but as-
sume that when able to repay jointly, the group will cooperate and fully repay the
group loan:
Ft(h − e) ≤ Πt ⇔
n∑
i
c(Ft, piit) = Ft(h − e) (3)
To see that this is a Nash equilibrium, consider a group able to repay, Ft(h − e) ≤
Πt. If a client’s peers jointly contribute Ft(h− e)− c(Ft, piit), her dominant strategy
3Several factors could explain why clients rarely default strategically (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). Clients
may for instance have compulsory savings that the bank can use to enforce partial loan repayment or fear pressure and
harassment from loan officers.
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is to contribute c(Ft, piit) because the value of continuation is strictly positive. A
lower contribution would result in group default and prevent continuation to the
next loan cycle. The strategy to contribute c(Ft, piit) given that peers contribute
Ft(h − e) − c(Ft, piit) is hence incentive-compatible. By symmetry, this holds for
every client i.
Third, the analysis focuses on the interplay between formal insurance and so-
cial risk-sharing. The model abstracts from other coping mechanisms, apart from
current income. Survey data suggest that 27.8 percent of our study population
uses mutual insurance as their main strategy to cope with illnesses and injuries.
Another 22.6 percent relies on their business income as the most important source
to finance acute health expenditures. Substantially fewer respondents report other
insurance strategies like selling assets or depleting their savings.
Clients’ risk preferences form the fourth building block of the model. Client
i ∈ {1, ..., n} with a degree of risk aversion θi ∈ Θ maximizes expected utility
over the present and all future loan cycles. Utility is time-separable, and utility
from earning X within a round is U(X; θi), with U′(X; θi) > 0, U′′(X; θi) < 0 and
U(0; θi) = 0. Clients are risk averse because U′′(X; θi) < 0. These are the only
restrictions on the parameter set Θ.
We define a threshold level of risk aversion θ∗ ∈ Θ such that a client with
θi = θ
∗ is indifferent between enrolling and not enrolling in a context without joint
liability or dynamic incentives; in other words, is indifferent between risk-free
earnings e − ph and a gamble of earning e only when healthy:
U(e − ph; θ∗) = (1 − p)U(e; θ∗) (4)
Recall that health expenditures exceed earnings net of loan repayment, h > e.
Uninsured ill clients therefore do not fully repay their share of the loan. As a
result, the one-time earnings with insurance, e−ph, are strictly below the expected
one-time earnings without insurance, e(1 − p), and risk averse clients may forgo
actuarially fair insurance.4
4Insurance is actuarially fair from the perspective of the insurer, but not from the perspective of clients. They have
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Equation (4) defines two types of clients: clients with high risk aversion (the
‘high RA’ type), with a risk aversion parameter θi ≥ θ∗, and clients with low risk
aversion (the ‘low RA’ type), with θi < θ∗. High RA clients weakly prefer to enroll
when facing an insurance decision without joint liability or dynamic incentives.
Conversely, low RA clients will not enroll.
When optimizing expected utility, clients take into account beliefs about the
current and future number of insured peers and information on insurance decisions
in the past. They have complete information on pay-offs and types, as well as
perfect recall of peers’ past health shocks and insurance decisions.
2.2 The value of insurance
The insurance decision entails a social dilemma when clients strategically forgo
insurance even though insurance optimizes group welfare. We consider parameter
ranges in which group welfare is highest if all clients enroll in every loan cycle
t (‘Full Enrollment’, FE). This section first defines total expected utility under
FE, where dit = 1 for all i, t, and compares it to total expected utility when no
client ever enrolls, i.e. dit = 0 for all i, t (‘Zero Enrollment’, ZE). Next, we state a
number of key conditions regarding these two values.
The value of FE in loan cycle t is defined as client i’s total discounted expected
utility if the entire group has insurance in the current and all future loan cycles. In
this case, client i’s disposable income is e − ph forever,
Vt(FE; θi) ≡
∞∑
s=t
βt,sU(e − ph; θi), (5)
where βt,s ≡ 1/(1 − δt,s) < 1 is the period-t discount factor and δt,s the period-t
discount rate for loan cycle s. The present loan cycle is not discounted, so βt,t = 1.
limited liability, because delinquents do not fully repay their loan. Delinquency is an externality either for the jointly liable
group or the microfinance institution.
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Client i’s value with no group member ever having insurance, ZE, is:
Vt(ZE; θi) ≡
∞∑
s=t
Ps−t0 βt,s(1 − p) E U(e − c(Fs, e); θi) (6)
Under ZE, an uninsured individual is healthy with probability 1− p, earns piit = e,
and contributes c(Ft, piit). With probability p, a client is ill and has zero income,
piit = 0, yielding zero utility. The group continues borrowing with probability P0,
the probability that a fully uninsured group can repay the loan.
To restrict the analyses to parameters at which a social dilemma exists, we
specify three conditions. The first condition rules out the existence of ‘always-
takers’ who prefer to have insurance even if no other group member is ever in-
sured. Formally, the value of taking insurance once in an otherwise uninsured
group is strictly below the value of never enrolling, Vt(ZE; θi), even for the most
risk averse client:
sup
θ
[
E U(e − ph − c(Ft, e − ph); θi) + P1βt,t+1Vt+1(ZE; θi) − Vt(ZE; θi)] < 0 (7)
A client who is the only one in her group to have insurance earns e, pays the
insurance premium ph, and contributes c(Ft, e − ph). With probability P1, her
group (with one insured client) repays and continues to the next loan cycle.5
Condition (7) is very weak. Although insured clients are less likely to incur
own health expenses, they are more likely to contribute for ill peers. This reduces
the benefits of insurance in otherwise uninsured groups substantially.
A second condition is that full group enrollment in all periods, FE, is welfare-
improving on zero enrollment, ZE, for all θi ∈ Θ:
Vt(FE; θi) > Vt(ZE; θi) θi ∈ Θ (8)
This condition holds for every θi ∈ Θ if it also holds for the lowest degree of risk
5Note that if a client prefers not to have insurance once in an otherwise uninsured group, this will generalize to any
number of loan cycles under the assumption that the discount rate, δt,s, is constant or increasing in t.
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aversion, i.e. the limiting case of risk-neutrality. This is true for a wide range of
parameters. Condition (8) is always satisfied for the high RA type:
LEMMA 1 If θi ≥ θ∗, then Vt(FE; θi) > Vt(ZE; θi).
See Appendix A for all proofs. For high RA clients, FE has three benefits com-
pared to ZE. Within a round, it mitigates their own risk of incurring health expen-
ditures. It also reduces the risk of contributing for ill peers. Further, by eliminating
the group default risk, it increases future expected utility. This also explains why
the second inequality in Lemma 1 is strict.
Figure 2 shows the combinations of health shock probabilities p (horizontal
axis) and a constant discount factor β (vertical axis) that satisfy Condition (7)
and Condition (8).6 Regime 1 violates Condition (8) in the limiting case of risk-
neutrality. At high discount rates, or low β, clients with linear utility do not suf-
ficiently value the increased probability of continued access to loans, so that FE
does not improve welfare over ZE. The same might hold for the low RA type with
θi ∈ Θ, θi < θ∗. Also, as the health shock probability and hence the insurance
premium increases, FE becomes increasingly unattractive since the premium is
not actuarially fair from a client’s perspective.
In Regime 4, Condition (7) does not hold, meaning that we cannot rule out
the existence of ‘always-takers’. At very low discount rates, or high β, infinitely
risk averse clients always prefer to have insurance, even in otherwise uninsured
groups. Insurance increases the continuation probability from P0 to P1, which
they value more than the cost of paying the premium and having to contribute for
delinquent peers at the same time. We therefore restrict the analyses to Regimes
2 and 3, where every client prefers FE over ZE, regardless of her level of risk
aversion θi ∈ Θ, and where taking insurance in an otherwise uninsured group
reduces welfare for even the most risk averse client.
6The figure fixes other parameters to the values as adopted in the game, with n = 5, h = e + l, and c(Ft , piit) =
min(piit , Ft(h − e)/(n − Ft)). We also analyzed whether Conditions (7) and (8) hold for other values of n, h and e, and
assuming a changing discount factor (most notably the discount factor used to analyze optimal behavior in the experiment:
βt,s = 1 for all s ≤ 4 and βt,s = (5/6)s−max{t,4} for all s > 4). These analyses yielded qualitatively similar predictions
(calculations available upon request).
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A third condition is that the probability of continuation satisfies Pn−1 = 1,
meaning that n− 1 insured clients earn enough to contribute for the one uninsured
group member, (n − 1)(e − ph) ≥ h − e. This constrains the ratio of net earnings
after loan repayment and health expenditures:
e
h
>
1 + (n − 1)p
n
(9)
Without loss of generality, this condition makes the free-riding problem more
salient. If all peers enroll, a client can decide to forgo insurance without reducing
the probability that she continues to the next loan cycle.
These conditions ensure that FE optimizes total welfare in the group, not only
compared to ZE, but compared to any insurance allocation within the group. The
following lemma states that if all group members prefer FE over ZE, group wel-
fare under FE is at least as large as under partial enrollment:
LEMMA 2 If (8) and (9) hold, then
∑
i V(FE; θi) ≥ ∑i V(d; θi) ∀ d ∈ DC,
where d is an n-vector with the ith element indicating that individual i has insur-
ance and DC is the set of insurance allocations satisfying nIt (e−ph) ≥ (n−nIt )(h−e)
- i.e. insured clients’ joint earnings are sufficient to contribute for the n − nIt unin-
sured peers. The insured clients will hence ensure continuation.
The intuition for this lemma is as follows. Because insurance is actuarially fair,
total group earnings under partial enrollment are a mean-preserving spread of risk-
free earnings under full enrollment (as long as a sufficient number of members
enroll to avoid group default). Partial enrollment raises expected earnings for
uninsured clients, but insured clients’ earnings are reduced by an equal amount
due to contributions for ill peers. Since utility is concave, full group enrollment
optimizes group welfare in Regimes 2 and 3.
2.3 The demand for group insurance
We consider two types of insurance: group insurance (GI) and individual insur-
ance (II). The former requires a unanimous decision to enroll. Every round, clients
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vote either for or against insurance. Voting occurs simultaneously and in private.
If and only if all group members vote for insurance, the group will have insurance.
Every client then pays the insurance premium. Without such unanimity, nobody
enrolls nor pays for insurance.
Let bit indicate the number of peers that client i believes will vote for insurance
in loan cycle t and d∗GI(bit; θi) her best response to this belief under group insur-
ance. By the following proposition, there is no free-riding under group insurance.
PROPOSITION 1 d∗GI(n − 1; θi) = 1 if and only if Condition (8) holds for θi. In
addition, d∗GI(bit; θi) = {0, 1} for all bit < n − 1.
Proof Assume that Condition (8) holds. FE improves individual welfare on ZE. If
client i believes that all peers will vote for insurance, bit = n−1, her best response
is to vote for insurance, d∗GI(n− 1; θi) = 1, and attain FE. If she believes that some
of her peers will not vote for insurance, bit < n − 1, her vote will not affect the
outcome or earnings, and the client is indifferent between voting for and against
insurance, d∗GI(bit; θi) = {0, 1}. Voting for insurance is a weakly dominant strategy.
Assume that Condition (8) does not hold. ZE improves individual welfare
on FE, or keeps welfare equal. Thus, if bit = n − 1, her best response is not
to vote for insurance and attain ZE. If bit < n − 1, she will again be indifferent
between voting for and against insurance. Voting for insurance is hence a weakly
dominated strategy.
Group insurance eliminates free-riding since a vote against insurance also bars all
peers from insurance. This increases the risk of contributing for peers and of group
default. Further, if Condition (8) holds, it is also relatively easy to coordinate on
FE because voting for insurance is a weakly dominant strategy for all clients. By
Lemma 2, taking insurance then maximizes group welfare.
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2.4 Individual insurance: A prisoner’s dilemma
In the individual insurance game, group members decide simultaneously and in
private whether to enroll in insurance. Unlike group insurance, a client can take
individual insurance independent of her peers’ decisions. Every client willing to
join pays the insurance premium and receives insurance coverage.
This section will derive whether FE is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for dif-
ferent types of players. We are interested in whether free-riding occurs among in-
dividuals who believe that all peers will enroll. Our purpose is to analyze whether
in theory the group can commit to FE when this outcome optimizes group wel-
fare. Many mixed strategies and other possible equilibria exist, but our aim is not
to provide a full listing of all equilibria.
Denote d∗II(bit, θi) as client i’s best response if she believes that bit peers will
enroll under individual insurance (II). We define free-riding as follows:
d∗II(n − 1, θi) = 0
In words, for a client who believes that all n−1 peers will enroll, the best response
is to forgo insurance. FE is then not an equilibrium. The next theorem states when
free-riding occurs. Appendix A provides a proof.
THEOREM 1 Given Condition (9) and Definition (4),
d∗II(n − 1, θi) =
1 ∀ θi ≥ θ
∗
0 ∀ θi < θ∗
and FE is not a Nash Equilibrium if at least one group member has θi < θ∗. If
in addition Condition (7) is satisfied for a contribution c(Fit, piit) as defined in
Equations (2) and (3), then there is at least one other Nash equilibrium, ZE:
d∗II(0, θi) = 0 ∀ θi ∈ Θ
Intuitively, by Condition (9), a client who believes that all peers will enroll be-
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lieves that her peers will ensure continuation to the next loan cycle, irrespective
of her own insurance decision. She hence faces a trade-off between the one-time
risk-free insurance option and a gamble with higher but uncertain earnings, as in
a context without joint liability and dynamic incentives.
By Definition (4), the best response is to enroll if and only if θi ≥ θ∗. Low RA
clients with θi < θ∗ will free-ride on contributions from insured peers, so FE is
not an equilibrium if at least one group member has low risk aversion. Conditions
(7) and (8) are not necessary for this first result.
Although FE is not always an equilibrium, ZE is. This holds independent of
clients’ level of risk aversion by Condition (7). Taking insurance in an otherwise
uninsured group is costly, even for high RA clients.
This results in equilibrium predictions for three types of groups. First, groups
with only low RA group members face a Prisoner’s Dilemma. While FE op-
timizes group welfare, every individual has a private incentive to free-ride and
forgo insurance, leading them to the ZE equilibrium. Every client will have lower
expected earnings, and face more risk than under FE.
Second, in mixed groups with a limited number of low RA clients, the less risk
averse will free-ride. More risk averse clients may in turn decide to forgo insur-
ance as well. Even if part of the group enrolls, total group welfare is suboptimal
by Lemma 2. Such free-riding does not only imply a transfer of expected earnings
from high RA to low RA clients, but also increases the variance of earnings over
time, harming high RA clients’ welfare.
Third, groups with only high RA members do not face a free-riding prob-
lem. The best response of a high RA client who believes that all peers will enroll
is to enroll as well. Because ZE is an equilibrium, groups with only high RA
clients might however fail to coordinate on the welfare-improving FE equilibrium
if clients believe some of their peers will not enroll.7
Finally, note that the model ignores losses due to lower productivity or sick-
7This coordination problem can also be interpreted as a case of background risk. Purchasing insurance increases the
probability of having to contribute for uninsured ill peers. So far, the literature has attributed low demand to other types of
background risk, for instance limited credibility of the insurance provider (Dercon, Gunning and Zeitlin, 2011).
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ness absenteeism. Our focus on expenditures does not qualitatively affect the
free-riding theorem. Even when insurance does not cover all losses associated
with health shocks, a level of risk aversion θ′ exists such that clients with θi < θ′
have an incentive to free-ride if FE optimizes group welfare. Income losses how-
ever may reduce the size of the area in which FE optimizes welfare by decreasing
future income. Thus, Regime 1 would encompass a larger range of parameter
values, while Regimes 2 and 3 diminish in size.
2.5 Solutions to free-riding
Although our theory predicts free-riding for a wide range of parameter combina-
tions, it is not trivial that our theorem holds empirically, especially in a microfi-
nance setting where group membership is a long-term commitment. Groups bor-
row often increasing amounts conditional on prior loan repayments, and switch-
ing groups is costly. Clients will hence face repeated insurance decisions within
the same group, and they might sanction free-riders by staying uninsured.8 Con-
ventional laboratory experiments indeed find that dynamic interactions enhance
cooperation (Bo´, 2005).
To analyze when dynamic interactions can induce cooperation in microinsur-
ance decisions, assume that the best response d∗II depends on past insurance deci-
sions. If diτ indicates the insurance decision of group member i ∈ {1, ..., n} in loan
cycle τ, with diτ = 1 if client i took insurance in cycle τ and diτ = 0 otherwise,
clients can for example play the following grim trigger strategy:
d∗II = min d jτ ∀ j , i, τ ∈ {1, ..., t − 1}
Assuming that all group members adopt this strategy, the strategy is credible since
ZE is an equilibrium by Condition (7). A client who believes that none of her peers
will enroll has no incentive to enroll herself.
8Alternatively, clients could exert direct social pressure. Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) show that individuals are willing
to punish their peers even if this is costly. We allow for retaliation through future decisions. Immediate sanctions are left
for future research.
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Dynamic incentives need to be sufficiently strong for this threat to be effective.
A client tempted to free-ride will enroll only if her current utility gain from free-
riding is smaller than future losses due to peers staying uninsured in the future:
(1 − p)U(e; θi) − U(e − ph; θi) ≤ βt,t+1 (Vt+1(FE; θi) − Vt+1(ZE; θi)) (10)
In Figure 2, Inequality (10) is not satisfied in Regime 2 with relatively low dis-
count factors, even in the limiting case of risk-neutrality. Regime 3 with a higher
discount factor, on the other hand, satisfies (10) for any θi ∈ Θ. Here, the threat of
future retaliation is sufficiently strong to commit free-riders to the social optimum.
Further, social ties, norms and communication in a group may reduce free-
riding (Sally, 1995). Even when oral agreements are not enforceable, empirical
evidence suggests that communication creates social capital, can reinforce social
norms and limit free-riding, for instance since individuals perceive a cost of lying
or feel guilt from blame (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Vanberg, 2008; Char-
ness and Dufwenberg, 2011). This result will be strongest in groups with close
social ties (Cassar, Crowley and Wydick, 2007). Further, communication shapes
focal points and beliefs, helping the group coordinate on full group enrollment.
To summarize, we hypothesize that microcredit groups with at least one low
RA client will have suboptimal demand for individual insurance due to a social
dilemma. If full group enrollment optimizes social welfare, even low RA clients
will be willing to join group insurance. They are however tempted to free-ride
under individual insurance, unless social ties, norms, communication or the threat
of retaliation in repeated insurance decisions induce cooperation. Otherwise, only
groups with high RA clients are able to coordinate on the social optimum.
3 Method
3.1 Design
To test the free-riding mechanism, we conducted a framed field experiment with
355 clients from a microfinance institution (MFI) in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
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Participants first played a basic microinsurance game to measure their risk aver-
sion type. A second game elicited their demand for either group or individual
insurance. This public goods game framed the insurance decision in a jointly li-
able microcredit group and closely resembled the theoretical framework described
in Section 2. For participants used to group lending, the microcredit frame may
trigger different norms and behavior compared to an abstract public goods game.
Framed field experiments offer several advantages over empirical methods
outside the laboratory. First, the laboratory provides a controlled setting where
distortions of e.g. initial beliefs, health and social capital do not bias the results.
Equilibrium strategies can thus be identified for different types of players. Second,
the experiment offers insights into the dynamics of repeated insurance decisions
within a short time span. Third, participants face real monetary incentives based
on their decisions during the games, which elicits behavior that differs from hy-
pothetical survey questions (Holt and Laury, 2002).
At the same time, the high degree of control in the laboratory goes hand-in-
hand with an abstraction from other mechanisms that drive insurance decisions.
Although the main game resembles group-based lending as closely as possible,
the demand for microinsurance in jointly liable credit groups depends on more
factors than can be studied simultaneously in a game. The concluding section
discusses a number of mechanisms to consider when interpreting our theoretical
predictions outside the laboratory.
3.1.1 Game 1: Measure for risk aversion
Participants first played an individual insurance game without joint liability or
dynamic incentives. The left-hand side of Figure 1, earnings before contributing,
represents this introductory lottery. A participant borrows l = 40, 000 Tanzanian
Shillings (TZS; 26.67 USD) and falls ill with probability p = 1/5.9 Healthy
participants, able to repay their loan, earn piit = e = 22, 500 after loan repayment.
9This is higher than the 10.2 percent of participants who report health expenditures equal to or above monthly per
capita income. Nonetheless, given the value of the discount rate β in the games, free-riding may occur in theory for all
p < 0.33 as we will show later using Figure 2.
18
Ill participants incur health expenditures that fully absorb their earnings before
loan repayment; h = 62, 500. As a result, they cannot repay their loan and receive
nothing, piit = e + l − h = 0.
Before the realization of the health shock, participants can take insurance at
a premium equal to ph = 12, 500. An insured player receives piit = e − ph =
10, 000 with certainty after loan repayment. The participant hence faces a trade-off
between lower risk-free earnings versus higher but risky earnings.10 By Definition
(4), a client has high risk aversion, θi ≥ θ∗, if and only if she enrolls. In that case,
her CRRA parameter is calculated to be θi ≥ 0.725, which Holt and Laury (2002)
classify as very risk averse. Because there is no joint liability, our measure reflects
risk attitudes rather than social preferences or beliefs about peers’ decisions. We
do not separate risk aversion from a certainty or framing effect, but the decision
in the first game is sufficient to separate the two theoretical participant types.
3.1.2 Game 2: Group versus individual insurance
Next, in groups of n = 5 clients, participants played a microinsurance game with
joint liability and dynamic incentives. Group members contribute for delinquent
peers who cannot repay their share of the loan, and defaulting groups do not con-
tinue to the next loan cycle. All other parameters are the same as in the first game.
Note that the group can contribute for at most one delinquent. If one group
member cannot repay, her four repaying peers (both insured and uninsured) each
contribute 10, 000. The group loan is fully repaid and the group continues to the
next loan cycle. If more than one group member cannot repay, the remaining
group members’ disposable income is at most three times 22,500, which is in-
sufficient to contribute the 80,000 required for two delinquents. In that case, the
group defaults and repays as much as it can afford. After contributing, profits are
zero for all members and the game ends.
10To enhance understanding of the dynamic incentives, a participant played two rounds of this game and moved to
the second round only if she repaid the first loan. Dynamic incentives are absent in the second and last round. The risk
aversion measure uses decisions in this round, assuming that uninsured individuals who defaulted in the first round would
have forgone insurance in the second round as well. Using first- instead of second-round decisions yields similar results.
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Similar to Cassar, Crowley and Wydick (2007), participants are told that they
will play the game for a large, unknown number of rounds to avoid a last round
effect. The game continues for at least four rounds as long as the group repays.
After the fourth round, one group member tosses a die. If the die lands at 1, the
game ends for the group.11 Or, as stated by one of the participants (based on
transcripts from participants’ communication during the games):
”I congratulate our sister for throwing another number than one, which
enables us to play this round. That means the game goes on and our
earnings increase as well.”
As earnings are accumulated within a relatively short time span, we assume
that there is no time discounting during a session.12 Rather, the value of future
rounds is determined by the probability of continuation in the game. We there-
fore substitute βt,s, the period-t discount rate for loan cycle s, by the conditional
probability of reaching round s:
βt,s = 1 ∀ s ≤ 4 and βt,s = 56
s−max{t,4}
∀ s > 4 (11)
The cross in Regime 3 of Figure 2 indicates the game-specific parameter values.
At the cross, free-riding problems exist but a coordinated grim trigger strategy is
credible and effective.13 Because participants will anticipate that the game cannot
continue forever, β = 5/6 is an upper bound for rounds 4 and higher. Nonetheless,
a free-riding problem also exists at lower values of β in Regime 2 and 3.
At the start of the experiment, every participant received a symbol that she was
asked not to reveal to others. Participants learned about the insurance decision and
health status of the other symbols in their group, i.e. their peers. This information
was revealed after every round, also after the first game used to elicit risk aversion.
Hence, participants know the types of their peers and can update their beliefs about
11Because of time constraints, clients played at most six rounds in practice, but were not informed of this.
12The time-separable utility function however does assume narrow bracketing of earnings into different loan cycles.
13The figure applies to rounds 4 and higher, in which β remains constant. However, calculations generalize to all
rounds with β as in (11). Calculations are available upon request.
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peers’ actions. The identification through anonymous symbols limits the effects
of future outside interactions on behavior in the game.
In this second game with joint liability, treatments vary in two dimensions.
First, under individual insurance (II), enrollment is an individual decision. Under
group insurance (GI), clients enroll if and only if all group members express their
willingness to join in an anonymous vote. This treatment reveals whether individ-
uals prefer full over zero enrollment in a context with joint liability and therefore
tests Condition (8). Alternative treatments such as mandatory insurance and indi-
vidual liability are unable to verify this key assumption. In the former alternative,
clients cannot reveal their preference, and in the the latter, insurance is valued
differently as there is no risk-sharing within the group. Group insurance provides
a benchmark for optimal demand and lower demand under individual insurance
indicates the social dilemma.
The experiment also varies the possibility to communicate. In treatments with-
out communication (II-NC and GI-NC), clients cannot talk to other participants.
In the communication treatments (II-C and GI-C), group members can talk for
two minutes preceding every round. This helps identifying whether verbal inter-
actions, inevitably occurring in real life, can solve the social dilemma. Assistants
tape-recorded, transcribed and translated communication to English.
Individual Insurance Group Insurance
No Communication II-NC ⇔ GI-NC
n = 75 (3 sessions) n = 90 (4 sessions)
Communication II-C ⇔ GI-C
n = 75 (3 sessions) n = 115 (4 sessions)
Treatments varied by session. We organized fourteen sessions with on aver-
age five groups of five clients each. The experiment included six sessions with
individual insurance, three with and three without communication, and 75 partic-
ipants in both treatments. Eight sessions were organized for the group insurance
treatments, four with and four without communication, with 115 and 90 partici-
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pants, respectively. Every participant was assigned to only one treatment to avoid
order effects.
3.2 Hypotheses
The main outcome of interest is the proportion of rounds that a participant is will-
ing to join insurance, henceforth called demand. Under group insurance, demand
is derived from the individual votes by round. These reveal whether participants
have a preference to enroll when there are no opportunities to free-ride.14 The
experiment tests for lower demand in individual compared to group insurance
sessions, distinguishing between three types of participants: (i) low RA clients,
(ii) high RA client in groups with at least one low RA member, and (iii) high RA
client in groups with only high RA members.
We test Theorem 1, which predicts suboptimal demand for groups with low
RA participants but not for groups with only high RA participants. When a
low RA participant believes that all her peers will enroll, her best response is
to take group but not individual insurance. Such free-riding may also affect de-
mand among high RA peers. The least risk-averse client of the high RA type will
not enroll as soon as she believes that at least one peer will free-ride. If a client
believes that more peers will free-ride, increasingly risk-averse participants will
decide not to enroll either. When all peers remain uninsured, even clients with
risk aversion going to infinity will forgo insurance.15
In contrast, in groups with only high RA clients, a client’s best response is
to enroll in individual insurance only if she believes that her high RA peers will
enroll as well. Uncertainty about peers’ actions may cause a coordination failure,
but the communication treatment will minimize the uncertainty about the behavior
of group members.
14We assume that participants play their weakly dominant strategy.
15Calculations are available upon request. Predictions also apply to a wider range of discount factors βt,s, and to the
specification for βt,s in (11).
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3.3 Procedures
The experimental sessions were organized near clients’ houses or businesses in
eight different areas of Dar es Salaam, in venues where credit groups typically
meet with their loan officers for weekly repayment. During these meetings, clients
were invited to come to one of the sessions, introduced as interactive seminars for
a research project on health insurance. They could bring along credit group mem-
bers. Clients were informed about the show-up fee of 7,000 TZS (US $ 4.67) and
that they could earn in addition up to 27,500 TZS (US $ 18.35). Every treatment
was played at most once in an area and treatments were not announced during
mobilization. Clients knew that only members of their MFI would participate,
that the research was independent of the MFI, and were assured confidentiality.
A session lasted approximately 3 hours. First, assistants administered a short
questionnaire on participants’ socio-demographics, health and credit group-related
characteristics. Three games were then played: (1) the first game with both insur-
ance and lending at the individual level to elicit a measure for risk aversion -
including a practice round; (2) the same game but with a higher insurance pre-
mium of 17,500 TSH, compared to the standard premium of 12,500 TSH, which
served as a robustness check; and (3) the main game with joint liability and dy-
namic incentives eliciting demand for either group or individual insurance - also
preceded by a practice round.
Participants received their earnings after every round. This helped understand
the financial implications of their decisions and will have induced them to bracket,
or evaluate, earnings by round rather than in terms of cumulative outcomes. At
the same time, it may have created wealth effects. This experiment could not
randomly select one of the rounds for payment, since dynamic incentives are a
core feature of the game. Individual earnings were therefore stored in closed boxes
(piggybanks), so that participants would not keep accumulated earnings on hand.
Total earnings from the piggybank were paid in cash at the end of the session. For
every 10,000 earned, a participant received 1,000 TZS. The average participant
earned 18,000 TZS (US $ 12), approximately 2.5 days of business profit.
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4 Data
4.1 Study population and participant characteristics
The microfinance games were played by clients of Tujijenge Tanzania Ltd, an
MFI providing microcredit in several areas of Dar es Salaam since 2006. Tu-
jijenge currently has approximately 12,800 members engaged in group lending
schemes. The average loan size is 450,000 Tanzanian Shillings (US $ 300) and
clients pay 12 percent interest per loan cycle of three months. Groups of five to
seven members are jointly liable for repayment. They formulate by-laws such as
fines for not repaying (“delinquency”) in their weekly meetings.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1 describe the main characteristics of the 355
participants in the games. Panel A summarizes demographic and socio-economic
characteristics. As is common in MFIs, the majority of our participants is female.
Participants are on average 36 years old and 76.1 percent is married. The average
participant has 5.1 household members and has completed around 7 years of edu-
cation, corresponding to primary school. Monthly per capita income is on average
84,400 TZS (US $ 54).
Panel B describes the population in terms of health characteristics. Just more
than half (54.9 percent) of the participants consulted a health care provider in the
past three months, and for 73.5 percent, at least one other household member did
so. Health expenditures, averaged over all household members over that same
period, were 43,000 TZS, or 8,300 TZS (US $ 5) per capita. This is 9.9 percent of
monthly per capita income. In the past three months, the event that a household
member needed health care but did not receive it due to a lack of money occurred
on average 0.6 times. Finally, although 41.1 percent of the participants know
what health insurance is, only 7.3 percent are enrolled; mainly because insurance
is virtually inaccessible for workers outside the formal sector.
Panel C presents credit-related variables. The average monthly business profit
is TZS 226,000 (US $ 145) and represents a considerable proportion of total
household income. The average participant has been a member of Tujijenge for
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a little more than one year, and eleven percent of participants are waiting to take
out their next loan. Approximately one third indicates that at least one member
of their credit group defaulted during a meeting in the past three months. Re-
spondents contributed for almost all delinquents. Among respondents who failed
to repay themselves, a much lower percentage reports that group members con-
tributed. Participants are either more supportive to their group members than non-
participants, or give socially desirable answers to these sensitive questions.
The last variable examines the social ties between group members in the games.
Within sessions, participants were randomly assigned to groups. On average 0.5
of their game group members were also a member of their real credit group. Pre-
existing social ties could potentially affect enrollment decisions through trust, co-
operation and beliefs. We will exploit random variation in the number of real
group members to check whether social ties offer a solution to the social dilemma.
The next section discusses Panel D. Columns (3) and (4) compare our sample
to a representative survey among 407 Tujijenge clients conducted three months
before the microfinance games. Column (3) gives the population averages based
on this survey and the significance of the t-statistic from testing for equal means in
the two samples. Column (4) shows the standard deviation of relevant variables.
Game participants are more likely to be female, have larger households, less
education and are less likely to be insured than the average Tujijenge member.
Participants are also twice as likely to have visited a health provider in the past
three months. This could be due to an explosion in a munition depot near one
of the study areas just prior to the games. This accident caused injuries for a
substantial proportion of households in surrounding areas.
The sample of participants does not perfectly resemble the respondents in the
representative survey. As is common in framed field experiments, microfinance
clients would only attend a session when interested. Further, since the survey was
conducted three months earlier, it will have included clients who already dropped
out of the group by the time of the experiment, as well as inactive clients from the
MFI’s register who were not borrowing at the time of the experiment. This should
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be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
4.2 Risk aversion
Panel D summarizes the measure of risk aversion. Using the first game without
joint liability and dynamic incentives, we classify 25.6 percent of the participants
as ‘low risk averse’; 46.2 percent are of the ‘high risk aversion’ type with at least
one low RA peer; and the remaining 28.1 percent are ‘high risk averse’ partici-
pants with only high RA peers.
This large share of high RA participants implies a relatively risk averse sam-
ple compared to participants in conventional risk lotteries as discussed in Section
3.1.1. Framing the lottery as an insurance decision may have induced loss-averse
behavior or a preference for certainty. This does not confound our identification
strategy, which only requires that first-game decisions predict second-game equi-
librium strategies.
Due to time constraints within sessions, we did not play standard risk lotteries
such as Binswanger or Holt and Laury. To validate our measure, Columns (5)
to (8) present a Probit model for low risk aversion as a function of participants’
characteristics. Columns (7) and (8) only include the variables common to both
the representative survey and the questionnaire administered with participants in
the experiment.
Consistent with our expectations, women as well as participants with higher
household health expenditures are more risk averse, although the coefficient for
the first variable is not statistically significant in the full model. Participants from
larger households, who have more opportunities for intra-household risk-sharing,
and those with health insurance are less risk averse. The latter finding is most
likely due to a wealth effect. In the absence of microinsurance only formally
employed households have access to insurance.
Risk aversion increases with the number of membership years and with having
an outstanding loan. People in debt might be more risk averse. None of the
delinquency and contribution variables in Panel C is significant. This increases
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confidence that the risk aversion measure is not correlated to social preferences or
‘good borrower behavior’, but rather measures preferences towards the riskiness
of private earnings.
The extent of free-riding depends on the target group’s risk profile. Our theory
predicts that the social dilemma will be more pronounced in target groups with
a large proportion of low RA individuals. We use the model in Columns (7)
and (8) to predict out-of-sample that 30.7 percent of clients in the target group
have low risk aversion (see Column (3) in Panel D). This is slightly higher than
the 25.6 percent in the participant sample. Our results will therefore represent a
lower bound for the level of free-riding in the population. The difference in the
proportion of clients with low risk aversion is however not significant. Standard
errors calculated by means of the Delta method yield a 95 percent confidence
interval equal to [23.3, 38.2].
4.3 Balance of characteristics over treatments
To examine the comparability of treatment groups, Table 2 compares the charac-
teristics of participants in group insurance versus individual insurance sessions.
The first two columns compare low RA participants under individual and group
insurance. The next two columns restrict the sample to high RA participants with
low RA peers. The last two columns present the same comparison for high RA
participants with only high RA peers.
The assignment to treatments seems to have resulted in relatively comparable
treatment groups. Participants in group insurance and individual insurance ses-
sions are very similar in terms of most key characteristics. Only a few character-
istics are not well balanced over the two treatments. Under individual insurance,
low RA participants are younger and less likely to have defaulted in the past 3
months; high RA participants with low RA peers come from larger households
with higher business profits and fewer outstanding loans; high RA participants
with only high RA peers are more likely to have insurance and outstanding loans.
We will show that the regression results are robust to including these characteris-
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tics as control variables.
Some of the game-related variables in Panel D vary in absolute terms across
treatments. The risk types themselves are well-balanced across treatments. In the
group insurance treatment, 26.3 percent of participants are of the low RA type,
versus 24.7 percent in the individual insurance treatment (p = 0.722). However,
participants offered individual insurance are less often grouped with peers of the
same type. As a result, the number of low RA peers is lower under individual
insurance. The regressions will control for this variable and analyze interaction
effects with the individual insurance treatment.
Further, health shocks are random in the games and occur for around 20 per-
cent of the observations as predicted by the law of large numbers. Nonetheless,
their incidence is not perfectly balanced, especially in the first game and for low
RA participants. Results are robust to including the proportion of ill rounds in the
first game as well as the public goods game as control variables.
5 Results
This section tests Theorem 1, focusing on ‘demand’ as the main outcome variable,
i.e. the proportion of rounds that a participant is willing to join while still in the
game. We first treat every session as one observation and use a one-sided Mann-
Whitney test to examine whether individual insurance sessions rank lower in terms
of average demand compared to group insurance. Second, a regression model
for individual demand tests whether the non-parametric findings are robust to the
inclusion of control variables. Third, we analyze to what extent communication
and social ties affect the main results. The final part analyzes whether results are
sensitive to the number of low RA peers.
We use the proportion of rounds that a participant is willing to join instead of
the willingness to join per round to avoid an attrition bias due to selective group
default. Figure 3 plots the cumulative percentage of participants that are out of
the game in a given round by risk aversion type. High RA types with only high
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RA peers are excluded from the figure because these groups never defaulted. The
figure shows substantial default rates, especially in the group insurance treatment.
Treating every participant instead of every decision as one observation reduces the
bias due to selective group default.16
5.1 Non-parametric findings
Figure 4 presents the demand for health insurance among low RA participants.
Panel (a) shows the average percentage of rounds that low RA participants are
willing to join in group insurance (GI) and in individual insurance (II) sessions,
without communication (NC) and with communication (C), respectively. Demand
is high under group insurance. The average low RA participant votes for insurance
in 84 percent of all rounds. Under individual insurance, the low RA type is sig-
nificantly less willing to join, and takes insurance only in 42 percent of all rounds
(p < 0.01). Panel (b) disaggregates demand by round. In line with Theorem 1,
demand for individual insurance is suboptimal in every round.
Figure 5 shows demand for group versus individual insurance among high
RA participants with at least one low RA peer. Panel (a) again gives average
demand by session. Demand is high throughout the game for both group and
individual insurance. Participants are willing to join in 93 and 89 percent of all
rounds, respectively. Individual insurance sessions do not rank significantly lower
than group insurance sessions. Panel (b) disaggregates demand by round and
shows that there is a difference only from round 3 onwards. This difference is not
statistically significant.
Figure 6 finally compares the willingness to join group insurance versus indi-
vidual insurance among high RA participants with only high RA peers. Consistent
with Theorem 1, demand for insurance is high among this subset of participants
in both treatments. On average, participants vote for insurance in 99 percent of
16Section 6 returns to the policy implications of these differential default rates. We have also performed all analyses
using the decision per round as unit of observation. To control for selective attrition in these analyses, we have a) estimated a
Heckman selection model, and b) imputed missing observations with either the last-round decision or a predicted insurance
decision. The key results are very similar to the results presented here and are available upon request.
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the rounds in the group insurance treatment. Individual insurance sessions do not
rank significantly lower, with participants joining insurance in 94 percent of the
rounds. Panel (b) presents the willingness to join insurance by round. Demand
for individual insurance is slightly lower in later rounds but again this is not sta-
tistically significant.
In sum, the non-parametric analysis demonstrates that average demand among
low RA participants is significantly lower in individual insurance sessions. While
the vast majority of this type is willing to join group insurance, a substantial share
of low RA participants forgoes insurance when offered at the individual level.
High RA participants on the other hand have high demand for insurance in both
treatments, regardless of their peers’ types.
5.2 Regression analyses
To test whether these findings are robust to the inclusion of control variables, we
estimate a linear model for demand digs. This variable indicates the proportion of
rounds that member i of group g in session s is willing to join. The estimating
equation is:
digs = α + βII IIs + βlranlraigs + βxxigs + εigs (12)
where IIs equals 1 under individual insurance and 0 under group insurance, nlraigs
is the number of low RA peers, xigs is a control variable, and εigs an individual-
specific residual, assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors.
Table 3 presents the results for the three subsamples of participants. Column
(a) indicates the number of observations for each subsample and (b) their average
demand under group insurance. Column (1) controls only for the number of low
RA peers. The next columns also control for the variables that significantly differ
between group and individual insurance for the low RA subsample (see Table 2).
These are, consecutively, the proportion of rounds that a participant was ill in the
first game in Column (2); her age in Column (3); a binary variable that indicates
whether peers contributed for her in Column (4); and the proportion of rounds that
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she was ill in the main public good game in Column (5).17
We test whether the difference in demand between group and individual in-
surance, βII in Equation (12), is negative. Every panel in Table 3 presents this
estimated coefficient, βˆII , followed by its standard error in parentheses, clustered
at the session level. The next row shows the probability that demand for indi-
vidual insurance is suboptimal, βII < 0. Due to a relatively small number of 14
sessions, the table presents the one-sided t-percentile in a clustered wild bootstrap.
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) show that this procedure improves inference
even when there are as few as five clusters and that this generalizes to cases where
the dependent variable is binary instead of continuous.18 The final row shows the
R-squared.
Panel A restricts the sample to low RA participants. The estimated difference
is similar in size and significance to the non-parametric estimate. A large share is
willing to join group but not individual insurance. In Column (1), individual in-
surance reduces demand significantly by 43.3 percentage points. This estimate is
robust to the inclusion of different controls in Columns (2) to (5). Thus, the slight
imbalance in observed characteristics between the treatments cannot account for
the large difference in demand for group insurance versus individual insurance.
Panel B estimates the main equation for high RA clients with low RA peers.
These results are similar to the non-parametric estimates as well. In the regres-
sion framework, demand is on average 3.4 percentage points lower for individual
insurance than for group insurance in Column (1). This is a small and statistically
insignificant difference. The estimates in Columns (2) to (5) are very similar.
Panel C tests for suboptimal demand among high RA clients with only high
RA peers. Individual insurance reduces demand by 6.2 percentage points in Col-
umn (1). This difference is relatively small but statistically significant, also when
adding controls in Columns (2) to (5). A potential explanation is that the high
17We restrict the control set to enable inference in the presence of a limited number of sessions. Results do not change
qualitatively when a larger set of control variables is simultaneously included or when we include additional variables
that are significant in the comparison for high RA types. Having defaulted is collinear with peers having contributed, and
therefore not presented as a separate control variable.
18The bootstrap procedure imposes βII = 0 and uses Rademacher weights for the residuals.
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RA participants face a coordination failure. In this case, the problem will be most
pronounced in the first round, when participants have not observed their peers’
decisions yet and uncertainty is highest. An alternative hypothesis is that some
participants have a degree of risk aversion just above the threshold θ∗, as mea-
sured at the start of the session. When they accumulate earnings throughout the
game, they might become less risk averse and act as the low RA type in later
rounds.
Panel A in Table 4 estimates Equation (12) for the first round only. Differ-
ences in wealth effects and peers’ enrollment decisions between group and indi-
vidual insurance do not yet influence demand in this round. The first row restricts
the sample to low RA clients. Each specification shows a significantly negative
coefficient for the individual insurance variable, consistent with Theorem 1.
The second row estimates demand among high RA clients with low RA peers.
Their demand in the first round is not significantly lower under individual insur-
ance. Also the third row, focusing on groups with high RA members only, finds no
significant effect of individual insurance. This result is difficult to reconcile with
a coordination failure, and seems more consistent with the hypothesis that some
high RA participants become less risk averse as they are accumulating wealth.
Panel B shows estimates of βII for rounds 2 and higher where participants
have updated their beliefs and behavior is influenced by prior decisions. The
results become somewhat more pronounced, but the size and significance of the
estimates remain broadly similar to that of the estimates in Table 3.
Thus, the regression analyses show a pattern close to the non-parametric re-
sults. None of the unbalanced characteristics and game-related variables distort
our main findings. Low RA participants have significantly lower demand under
individual compared to group insurance throughout the game. For high RA par-
ticipants both with and without low RA peers, the differences between group and
individual insurance are limited and do not appear until later rounds, if at all. The
high RA types might become less risk averse as they accumulate wealth, inducing
some to start free-riding in later rounds.
32
This indicates that a substantial proportion of low RA clients are free-riding
on their high RA peers. Repeated interactions, communication, social ties and
social norms, the solutions to the free-riding problem as discussed in Section 2.5,
do not enforce cooperation in all groups.
5.3 Communication and social ties
As discussed in Section 2.5, communication and social ties in microcredit groups
may offer a solution to free-riding. To test whether social interactions influence
behavior in our experiment, Table 5 presents findings by communication treat-
ment in Columns (2) and (3), and for groups without and with prior social ties in
Columns (4) and (5), respectively. In groups with prior social ties, at least two
participants know each other from their real microcredit group. The table presents
estimates separately for the three types of participants. All estimates of βII control
for the number of low RA peers.
The first column repeats the estimates from Column (1) in Table 3. In Columns
(2) and (3), the sample is disaggregated by communication treatment. To shed
light on the robustness of free-riding to the option to communicate, we test whether
demand in the communication treatment is lower under individual insurance com-
pared to group insurance, βII < 0.19
Panel A estimates demand for low RA participants. Inference is weak for the
subsamples with and without communication due to a smaller number of sessions.
However, the estimated difference between group and individual insurance is large
even when communication is permitted in Column (3). Panel B estimates the same
model for high RA participants with at least one low RA peer. Their demand
under individual insurance is significantly lower than under group insurance only
if communication is permitted (p < 0.10).
Finally, Panel C restricts the analyses to high RA participants with only high
RA peers. In Column (3), the difference is significantly negative, which implies
19Since our aim is not to compare the two communication treatments, the table does not test for equal coefficients in
Columns (2) and (3). Test statistics are available upon request.
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that demand can be suboptimal even when group members have the opportunity
to communicate. Recall from the discussion of Table 4 that some high RA partic-
ipants, potentially driven by wealth effects, may have decided to free-ride in later
rounds.
Why does communication not solve the social dilemma under individual in-
surance? The transcripts of the recorded communication demonstrate that partici-
pants are very much aware of free-riding:
”We all agreed from the start that we take health insurance but one person
betrayed us. It is nothing but greed. He fell sick and now we have to
contribute for him.”
Nonetheless, communication is not sufficient to enforce the social optimum. Al-
though participants condemn their peers for not taking insurance, and these peers
promise to take insurance, communication sometimes remains cheap talk as ac-
knowledged by a frustrated participant:
“Although we discuss and reach an agreement here, some of us are going
to change their mind when they proceed to the assistant.” [from whom
the participant can purchase insurance]
Further, whereas the group discussions mostly create focal points to take insur-
ance, the discussions move a few groups away from full enrollment:20
Person 1: “It is better not to take it and find your own way to get money
when you are sick. And if you are not sick the money is gone.” [...]
Person 4: “Let us not take health insurance.”
As a second measure of social interactions, Columns (4) and (5) test whether the
results are robust to the presence of pre-existing social ties within groups. Pre-
existing ties may enhance commitment and coordination in microcredit groups
20Only after the game ended due to default two rounds later, the group realized that it would have been better to enroll:
Person 1: “We are out. Only if we would have taken health insurance the game could not end for us.”
Person 2: “I told you that health insurance is very important but you did not want to listen to me.”
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(Cassar, Crowley and Wydick, 2007). Because participants were randomly as-
signed to groups, the number of peers from their real credit group is exogenous
within sessions. We can hence test whether demand is suboptimal also in groups
whose members have close social ties.
Column (4) restricts the sample to participants assigned to a group without
any of their real microcredit group members. Column (5) focuses on participants
that have close social ties with at least one of their group members in the games.
Demand for individual insurance is suboptimal in both cases among low RA par-
ticipants. This suggests that our experimental evidence of free-riding is not an
artifact of anonymous groups, and that they may generalize to real microcredit
groups with frequent social interactions.
For high RA participants with low RA peers, individual insurance does not
affect demand both in groups with and without social ties. Finally, for groups
with only high RA participants, demand under individual insurance is lower only
in groups without prior social ties. This provides some suggestive evidence for
social ties solving the social dilemma among this subsample.
5.4 The number of low RA peers
This section investigates to what extent our results are sensitive to differences
in the number of low RA peers within a group. Theorem 1 predicts that when all
peers are of the high RA type - which we use as a proxy for the belief that all peers
will enroll - a client’s best response is not to enroll if and only if she is of the low
RA type herself. To test this empirically, we investigate whether the difference in
demand for individual versus group insurance is heterogeneous depending on the
number of low RA peers, nlraigs. Due to the random assignment to groups within a
session, this variable is exogenous.
Adding the interaction between the number of low RA peers and the individ-
ual insurance variable to Equation (12), we obtain the following linear model for
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demand:21
digs = γ + δII IIs + δlranlraigs + η(IIs × nlraigs) + ωigs (13)
A free-riding participant will always opt out of individual insurance, even
when she believes that all her peers will enroll, bigs = n − 1. Because mainly
low RA but not high RA types forgo individual insurance, the interaction between
individual insurance IIs and the number of high RA peers, n − 1 − nlraigs, proxies
beliefs under the assumption that participants use peers’ prior decisions to update
their beliefs. We reject the free-riding hypothesis if δII = 0, that is, if participants
enroll when all peers are of the high RA type, nlraigs = 0, and the participant hence
believes that they will all enroll, i.e. bigs = n − 1.
Table 6 estimates Equation (13). Results are presented for low RA and high
RA participants separately. Columns (1) and (3) look at demand in the second
round only. These columns represent the initial response to having a low RA peer
in the individual insurance treatment. The dependent variable in Columns (2) and
(4) is the proportion of rounds that a participant is willing to join using Rounds
2 to 6. The coefficients in these columns reflect group dynamics over the entire
game, including peers’ responses to ones own past behavior.
The first row presents the coefficient for individual insurance, δII , i.e. the
difference in demand for participants who do not have any low RA peers. Con-
sistent with the free-riding hypothesis, this coefficient is negative and significant
for low RA participants in Column (1) and Column (2). A large number of low
RA participants opt out even if they believe that all peers will enroll. For high RA
participants with only high RA peers, we do not find a significant difference in
Columns (3) and (4) - consistent with previous estimates. They are not tempted to
free-ride.
Members of social risk-sharing networks may sort on risk attitudes (Genicot
and Ray, 2003; Attanasio et al., 2012). This could result in homogeneous groups
with either only high RA clients, or only low RA clients. An empirical question
21We do not include control variables here, but the estimates are robust to the inclusion of the control variables listed
in Table 2.
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is hence whether the social dilemma becomes more pronounced if a group has a
larger fraction of low RA members.
The second row indicates by how much every additional low RA peer reduces
demand for individual insurance. Among low RA participants, we find a robust
and significant negative effect of having an additional low RA peer under indi-
vidual insurance in Columns (1) and (2). This suggests that assortative matching
would magnify the social dilemma among the low RA. There is no significant
effect of additional low RA peers in Columns (3) and (4). High RA participants
apparently do not sanction their free-riding peers by forgoing insurance them-
selves.
Given the observed level of tolerance towards free-riding peers, it is rather
puzzling that not all low RA participants defect on full group enrollment. Despite
their unwillingness to join insurance in the first game without joint liability, some
choose to join when grouped with other clients. Communication, social ties and
trigger strategies - as discussed in Section 2.5 - do not appear to explain this find-
ing. We cannot rule out the hypothesis that pre-existing social norms have induced
cooperation among some low RA participants.
To conclude, we find substantial evidence of the free-riding hypothesis among
low RA types. Although insurance is welfare-enhancing even for low RA partici-
pants as revealed in the group insurance treatment, a large share forgoes individual
insurance at the expense of their insured peers. Despite the repeated nature of the
game, the threat of retaliation was not sufficiently strong to prevent all low RA
participants from free-riding. Throughout the game, relatively few high RA par-
ticipants conditioned their enrollment decision on the behavior of peers.
These patterns stand in contrast to findings from conventional laboratory ex-
periments in at least two respects. First, the tolerance for free-riders in this framed
field experiment is difficult to reconcile with high punishments observed even in
the last round of conventional public good games. Second, despite this tolerance
for free-riders in some groups, a number of low RA clients in other groups decide
to cooperate. A question for future research is whether this is due to social norms
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of solidarity among microfinance clients.
6 Policy implications and external validity
The previous section discussed demand, i.e. the willingness to join insurance.
Whereas demand and enrollment are the same variable under individual insur-
ance, they differ under group insurance because actual enrollment also depends
on peers’ decisions. Does free-riding reduce enrollment rates under individual
insurance and worsen other financial performance indicators as well? To answer
these questions, this section analyzes the implications of the various demand pat-
terns from three different perspectives: The insurance provider, the MFI and its
clients.
6.1 Insurance providers: Enrollment rates
Low enrollment rates reduce the size of the risk pool with potentially severe con-
sequences for the financial sustainability of insurance schemes. When insurance
is offered at the group level, one member can bar the entire group from enrolling.
This consideration makes insurance providers often hesitant to offer group insur-
ance. To quantify this effect in the microinsurance games, Panels A and B in
Table 7 estimate Equation (12) for demand and actual enrollment, respectively.
The analyses control for the number of low RA peers. Results are robust to the
inclusion of the other control variables presented in Table 1.
Column (1) includes the full sample. In line with the previous section, par-
ticipants in the group insurance treatment vote for insurance in the vast majority
of rounds, 92.7 percent. Individual insurance reduces demand by 15.2 percentage
points (p < 0.05, see Panel A). Actual enrollment rates in Panel B are however
not significantly lower under individual insurance.
Columns (2) to (4) disaggregate the estimates by participant type. Panel A
repeats the difference in demand by type as estimated in Column (1) of Table
3. Individual insurance substantially reduces demand as well as enrollment rates
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among low RA clients. A few low RA individuals consistently vote against group
insurance, reducing overall enrollment rates in this treatment, especially among
their high RA peers. Although the absolute number of rounds in which partici-
pants vote against group insurance is small, a mere 7.3 percent of negative votes
in Column (1) reduces total enrollment under group insurance to 80.4 percent.22
6.2 Microfinance institutions: Default rates
An important question for MFIs is which type of insurance minimizes default
rates. A reduced group default risk can be interpreted as a rent for the MFI when
interest rates are not adjusted down accordingly. Under individual insurance, un-
protected risk is scattered over groups, since clients can decide to enroll individu-
ally. Group insurance leads to a concentration of uninsured participants within a
few microcredit groups, which might increase groups’ vulnerability to collective
default. Conditional on the number of insured group members, predicted default
rates are therefore higher under group insurance.
Panel C in Table 7 estimates Equation (12) using expected group defaults,
i.e. the probability that a participant’s group defaults given the number of insured
members, as dependent variable. This probability is averaged over all rounds that
a group is still in the game. We use this calculated probability instead of actual
group defaults to control for differences in the incidence of health shocks under
group versus individual insurance.
For the total sample in Column (1), individual insurance decreases expected
group defaults compared to group insurance. This difference is however statisti-
cally not significant. Also in Columns (2) and (4), for low RA clients and high RA
clients with only high RA peers, the differences in default rates are insignificant.
Only high RA clients with low RA peers are 4.5 percentage points less likely to
default in the individual insurance treatment.
In practice, group default rates in most MFIs are low. For instance, 98 percent
22In both treatments, enrollment rates in the experiment are relatively high compared to take-up rates outside the
laboratory. The framed field experiment abstracts from a number of other mechanisms that contribute to low enrollment
rates, for instance liquidity constraints and transaction costs.
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of Tujijenge groups repay their loan. Health shocks are nevertheless an important
constraint on borrowers’ individual capacity to repay. Participants reported that 28
percent of individual delinquencies in the last 3 months were caused by an illness
or injury in the household. This vulnerability to health shocks is common across
MFIs in different parts of the world. Failure to repay can cause extreme psycho-
logical pressure and distress. Individuals go to great lengths to avoid default and
the social shame and sanctions associated with it, underscoring the non-monetary
benefits of insurance offered by MFIs (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010).
6.3 Clients: Profits
Clients are concerned with earnings levels and income fluctuations. Panel D in
Table 7 estimates the difference in expected profits, averaged over the different
rounds, between individual insurance and group insurance. Panel E repeats this
analysis for the variance of profits (in 10,000 TZS). Expected profits and the vari-
ance of profits are calculated based on a client’s own insurance status and the num-
ber of insured peers. We use the average within-round expectation and variance,
and do not take into consideration the risk of group default for ease of calculation.
Individual insurance does not significantly affect expected profits and its vari-
ance for the aggregate sample in Column (1). It should however not come as a
surprise that low RA clients in Column (2) earn significantly more under individ-
ual insurance (p < 0.01). Free-riding increases their profits by on average 23,400
TZS at the expense of their high RA peers in Column (3). Their profits also have
significantly higher variance under individual insurance.
Especially clients with high risk aversion will seek a stable level of profits,
shielded from excessive variance due to health expenses and contributions for
peers. In Column (4), restricting the sample to groups with high RA clients only,
we find no significant differences in expected profits between the two treatments,
nor in the variance. Note that pure high RA groups face very low variance in
either case due to the high levels of insurance take-up.
To summarize, lower demand of the low RA under individual insurance does
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not translate into significantly lower enrollment rates or higher group default risk.
Individual insurance induces a redistribution of profits from high to low RA clients
and potentially increases the variance of profits.
These findings highlight a second dilemma of microinsurance. On the one
hand, MFIs and insurance providers may prefer individual insurance schemes be-
cause they lead to similar enrollment rates and reduced default risk. On the other
hand, group welfare - and in particular welfare of more risk averse clients - will
be optimal under group insurance. To increase the number of groups enrolling in
group insurance (which reduces the aggregate default risk, benefiting the MFI),
insurance providers could experiment with more flexible group insurance prod-
ucts. These can for instance use majority voting rules that do not give veto power
to uninterested clients, or exempt individuals who are covered by other schemes.
7 Conclusion
In the absence of formal insurance, households rely on alternative risk manage-
ment strategies such as social risk-sharing arrangements. Although social net-
works provide only partial protection, demand for affordable microinsurance typ-
ically remains limited. This study provided and tested a mechanism to explain
these low enrollment rates.
We showed that the introduction of individual insurance in jointly liable credit
groups creates a social dilemma. Clients with low risk aversion are tempted to
forgo individual insurance even though the group would have been better off if all
group members had enrolled. For groups with only low RA clients, the insurance
decision hence entails a Prisoner’s Dilemma. But also in heterogeneous groups
with both low RA and high RA types, the high RA clients may forgo insurance if
they believe that their peers will remain uninsured. The binding nature of group
insurance offers a solution to this social dilemma and increases the demand for
health insurance to optimal levels.
To empirically test our theoretical framework, microinsurance games played
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with 355 microcredit clients in Tanzania elicited demand for individual versus
group insurance. This experiment yielded substantial support for the existence of
a social dilemma. While nearly all participants, 92.7 percent, were willing to join
group insurance, a large share of low RA participants - 58 percent - consistently
decided not to enroll in individual insurance, even when all peers enrolled. This
provides evidence of the free-riding hypothesis. In contrast, few groups with only
high RA clients failed to coordinate on the social optimum.
This study sheds light on the replicability of findings from conventional public
good games played in the laboratory. Consistent with such games, the social
dilemma in our framed field experiment resulted in suboptimal outcomes. An
open question is why the high RA participants did not sanction their free-riding
low RA peers through a trigger strategy, as is more common in the lab, and why a
number of low RA members cooperated without free-riders being sanctioned. The
microcredit frame combined with the non-standard type of participant may have
evoked a different set of norms and behaviors than is commonly observed among
student populations. This illustrates how external validity remains a caveat of
conventional laboratory experiments.
The results suggest that the choice to offer insurance either at the individual or
at the group level should reach beyond the standard concern for adverse selection
or administrative considerations. Because members of jointly liable credit groups
share risk, strategic decisions in such groups can be an important determinant
of the demand for microinsurance. In addition, group insurance eliminates the
opportunity to free-ride on peers, and hence reduces inequality within groups. In-
deed, in the experiment, group insurance significantly increased expected earnings
of high RA clients because they no longer had to contribute for their free-riding
peers.
However, enrollment rates were not significantly higher under group insurance
because a small minority of individuals consistently voted against it, barring their
peers from enrolling as well. Moreover, group insurance increased the probability
of group default due to a higher concentration of uninsured risk in a few groups.
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Adopting a less strict voting rule than unanimity and exemptions for some clients
may attenuate these unintended consequences. Further, group insurance is not
the only way to solve the social dilemma. Alternatives are for instance mandatory
enrollment, stronger social sanctions, individual liability for loan repayment, or an
individual insurance product that would only step in if too many group members
simultaneously incur a health shock.
The microinsurance games resembled the real world of the Tujijenge micro-
credit groups as closely as possible. However, the demand for microinsurance in
jointly liable credit groups depends on more factors than can be studied simultane-
ously in a game. A promising area for further research is to analyze the dynamics
between insurance and endogenous group formation. The introduction of insur-
ance may affect the optimal group composition. Insurance may for instance induce
sorting on preferences for formal insurance versus social risk-sharing. While mi-
croinsurance schemes are currently rolled out to existing microcredit group mem-
bers who face high switching costs, insurance may well affect group formation
of new microfinance clients, which in turn influences their demand for formal
insurance.
To conclude, we find suboptimal demand for individual insurance because
jointly liable microcredit group members free-ride on contributions from their
peers. This is not only relevant for the design of ongoing pilots of health insurance
schemes, but also for other types of microinsurance. Moreover, since social risk-
sharing arrangements exist beyond the credit group, the findings may generalize
to other pre-existing risk pools such as neighbors, migrant networks, informal
savings groups or cooperatives. As such, our findings may help explain low take-
up in a wide range of microinsurance schemes.
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Figure 1: Game tree.
Clients receive a loan l and earn e + l before loan repayment. The symbol p represents the health
shock probability, e private earnings net of loan repayment, h ∈ (e, e + l] health expenditures, Ft
the number of delinquent peers, Πt total income in the group, and c(Ft, piit) the contribution for
Ft delinquent peers, given an individual’s disposable income piit. Finally, βt,t+1 < 1 is the period-t
discount factor for period t + 1 and Vt+1 the value of continuing to the next loan cycle.
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Figure 2: Solution regimes.
Earnings net of loan repayment l are e = 9/16l, health expenditures h = e + l, the number of
group members n = 5 and the group can contribute for at most one delinquent peer. Regime 1:
V(FE; θi) > V(ZE; θi) if θi ≥ θ∗ (by Lemma 1) and V(FE; θi) < V(ZE; θi) in the limiting case of
risk-neutrality. Regimes 2-4: V(FE; θi) > V(ZE; θi) for all θi ∈ Θ. Regime 2 (3 and 4): Condition
(10) is violated (satisfied), so that dynamic incentives are too weak (sufficiently strong) for trigger
strategy to be effective. Regime 4: Condition (7) is violated, so ZE is not an equilibrium. A grim
trigger strategy is therefore not a credible threat.
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Figure 3: Individual (II) versus group (GI) insurance - Default rates
(a) Low RA participants
(b) High RA participants with at least one low RA peer
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Figure 4: Group (GI) versus Individual (II) Insurance - Low RA participants
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Notes: GI-NC: Group Insurance, No Communication. GI-C: Group Insurance, Communication.
II-NC: Individual Insurance, No Communication. II-C: Individual Insurance, Communication.
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Figure 5: Group (GI) versus Individual (II) Insurance - High RA, Low RA peer
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(a) Average demand by session
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(b) Average demand by round
Notes: GI-NC: Group Insurance, No Communication. GI-C: Group Insurance, Communication.
II-NC: Individual Insurance, No Communication. II-C: Individual Insurance, Communication.
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Figure 6: Group (GI) versus Individual (II) Insurance - High RA only
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(a) Average demand by session
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Table 1: Description of the study population
Games Tujijenge Probit Low Risk Aversion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) Low RA (s.e.) Low RA (s.e.)
A. Demographic and socio-economic characteristics
Female 74.6 67.8∗ -0.078 (0.067) -0.109+ (0.062)
Married 76.1 80.8 0.004 (0.064) -0.009 (0.060)
Age 36.0 (8.5) 36.0 (9.2) -0.176 (0.119) -0.165 (0.113)
Household size 5.1 (2.1) 4.6∗∗ (1.8) 0.029∗ (0.016) 0.027+ (0.014)
Years of education 7.7 (2.4) 8.2∗ (2.7) 0.014 (0.012) 0.013 (0.011)
Per cap. HH income 84.4 (60.4) 82.7 (76.9) 0.033 (0.050) 0.035 (0.032)
B. Health characteristics
Visited provider
- Self 54.9 24.8∗∗ -0.025 (0.061) -0.015 (0.058)
- HH member 73.5 37.6∗∗ 0.008 (0.086) 0.010 (0.080)
HH health expenses 43.0 (80.9) 32.5 (30.2) -0.015 (0.010) -0.017+ (0.009)
Nr. foregone care 0.6 (1.4) 0.015 (0.019)
Knows insurance 41.1 0.013 (0.057)
Has insurance 7.3 11.2+ 0.238∗ (0.131) 0.217∗ (0.119)
C. Microcredit variables
Profit business 226 (205) -0.005 (0.041)
Membership years 1.1 (1.6) -0.045∗ (0.021)
Has outstanding loan 89.0 97.1∗∗ -0.150 (0.105) -0.195∗ (0.096)
Last loan value 460 (369) 425 (353) -0.007 (0.045) -0.021 (0.040)
Delinquent in group 32.4 0.065 (0.084)
Contributed for peer 27.3 -0.051 (0.081)
Has been delinquent 13.0 -0.049 (0.105)
Peers contributed 6.8 0.224 (0.185)
Nr. real credit group 0.5 (0.8)
D. Risk aversion
Low Risk Aversion 25.6 30.71
High RA x LRA peer 46.2
High RA only 28.2
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01. 1Out-of-sample prediction using (8)-(9). Delta Confidence Interval: [23.3,38.2]
Binary variables presented in %. Monetary variables are in 1,000 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS), or approx. 0.67 USD
at exchange rates during the study. Column (4)-(5): survey among representative sample of 407 Tujijenge clients.
The table presents all variables available in both datasets and the stars in Column (4) indicate whether means in
the two datasets are significantly different. The Probit regressions in Columns (6)-(9) use a log transformation for
age, HH health expenses, household income, business profits and loan size.
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Table 2: Participants’ characteristics by treatment
Low RA HRA, LRA peer High RA only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GI II GI II GI II
A. Demographic and socio-economic characteristics
Female 68.5 70.3 74.1 79.5 77.1 73.3
Married 70.4 78.4 72.8 80.7 75.7 80.0
Age 36.4 33.2+ 35.4 36.4 36.3 38.0
Household size 5.5 4.8 4.7 5.5∗ 5.2 5.0
Years of education 8.0 8.6 7.7 7.7 7.3 7.4
Per capita HH income 82.3 91.5 86.8 88.3 80.3 71.6
B. Health characteristics
Visited provider 50.0 45.9 53.1 60.2 57.1 60.0
Other visited provider 64.8 64.9 74.1 77.1 81.4 70.0
HH health expenses 31.3 25.8 38.5 51.9 58.3 37.2
Nr. times foregone care 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.5
Knows insurance 42.6 51.4 34.6 45.8 34.3 46.7
Has insurance 13.0 16.2 3.7 6.0 1.4 13.3+
C. Microcredit variables
Profit business 213.8 229.1 208.7 275.3+ 204.4 213.0
Membership years 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.0
Has outstanding loan 88.9 75.7 93.8 85.5+ 90.0 100.0∗∗
Last loan value 452.7 448.6 417.6 518.8 420.9 529.7
Delinquent in group 37.0 32.4 28.4 33.7 35.7 23.3
Contributed for peer 29.6 27.0 21.0 31.3 27.1 30.0
Has been delinquent 20.4 5.4∗ 12.3 12.0 14.3 10.0
Peers contributed 14.8 0.0∗∗ 8.6 3.6 5.7 6.7
Nr. real credit group 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
D. Risk aversion and incidence of health shocks
Nr. low RA peers 1.5 0.9∗∗ 1.7 1.4∗ 0.0 0.0
Prop. ill rounds in first game 0.3 0.2∗ 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
Prop. ill rounds main game 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1∗
Observations 54 37 81 83 70 30
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 Binary variables presented in percentages. Monetary variables
are in 1,000 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS), or approx. 0.67 USD at exchange rates during the study.
Low RA: Clients with low risk aversion. HRA, LRA peer: Clients with high risk aversion and at
least one low RA peer. High RA only: Clients with high risk aversion and only high RA peers.
GI (II): Variable’s average value in the Group (Individual) Insurance treatment.
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Table 3: Demand for insurance by participant type
N Mean GI Difference II (βII)
A. Low RA (a) (b) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
βII 91 0.863 -0.433 -0.414 -0.465 -0.428 -0.449
(0.112) (0.118) (0.094) (0.112) (0.112)
P(βII < 0) 0.011∗ 0.014∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.010∗
R-squared 0.299 0.305 0.367 0.300 0.317
B. High RA with LRA peer
βII 164 0.912 -0.034 -0.028 -0.036 -0.033 -0.027
(0.052) (0.05) (0.056) (0.054) (0.056)
P(βII < 0) 0.286 0.304 0.269 0.276 0.341
R-squared 0.004 0.018 0.006 0.004 0.014
C. High RA only
βII 100 0.993 -0.062 -0.062 -0.063 -0.062 -0.060
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
P(βII < 0) 0.076+ 0.088+ 0.067+ 0.079+ 0.046∗
R-squared 0.084 0.084 0.087 0.089 0.085
Controls Ill fg Age Peers Ill mg
+ p < .1, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01. First line: OLS estimate. Second line: std. err. clustered by session. Third
line: one-sided t-percentile in wild cluster-bootstrap (999 replications). All equations control for a partici-
pant’s number of low RA peers. Other controls: ‘Ill fg’ (‘mg’) - proportion of ill rounds in first game (main
game); ‘Age’ - of participant. ‘Peers’ - Peers in real microcredit group contributed for participant. N: No.
of observations. Mean GI: Mean demand in the Group Insurance treatment. Difference II: Estimate of
βII in Equation (12).
55
Table 4: Demand for insurance by round
N Mean GI Difference II (βII)
A. Round 1 (a) (b) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low RA 91 0.852 -0.377 -0.326 -0.402 -0.374 -0.390
(0.125) (0.126) (0.113) (0.127) (0.125)
P(βII < 0) 0.029∗ 0.039∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.018∗
R-squared 0.178 0.209 0.204 0.178 0.187
High RA with LRA peer 164 0.926 -0.030 -0.029 -0.027 -0.030 -0.029
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.056)
P(βII < 0) 0.291 0.336 0.335 0.320 0.334
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.006
High RA only 100 0.986 -0.019 -0.017 -0.022 -0.019 -0.028
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022)
P(βII < 0) 0.315 0.327 0.337 0.328 0.275
R-squared 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.005 0.028
B. Proportion of rounds willing to enroll in Rounds 2 - 6
Low RA 91 0.871 -0.444 -0.429 -0.480 -0.443 -0.449
(0.114) (0.119) (0.096) (0.111) (0.115)
P(βII < 0) 0.009∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.004∗∗
R-squared 0.271 0.275 0.338 0.271 0.279
High RA with LRA peer 164 0.890 -0.011 -0.000 -0.014 -0.009 -0.006
(0.069) (0.069) (0.075) (0.071) (0.072)
P(βII < 0) 0.438 0.482 0.450 0.441 0.487
R-squared 0.003 0.033 0.007 0.003 0.009
High RA only 100 0.994 -0.071 -0.072 -0.072 -0.071 -0.068
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024)
P(βII < 0) 0.073+ 0.070+ 0.032∗ 0.063+ 0.030∗
R-squared 0.096 0.097 0.097 0.101 0.102
Controls Ill fg Age Peers Ill mg
+ p < .1, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01. First line: OLS estimate. Second line: std. err. clustered by session. Third
line: one-sided t-percentile in wild cluster-bootstrap (999 replications). All equations control for a partici-
pant’s number of low RA peers. Other controls: ‘Ill fg’ (‘mg’) - proportion of ill rounds in first game (main
game); ‘Age’ - of participant. ‘Peers’ - Peers in real microcredit group contributed for participant. N: No.
of observations. Mean GI: Mean demand in the Group Insurance treatment. Difference II: Estimate of
βII in Equation (12).
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Table 5: Demand without and with communication and social ties
Difference II (βII)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Low RA participants All No Comm Comm No ties Ties
βˆII -0.433 -0.364 -0.509 -0.377 -0.516
(0.112) (0.200) (0.059) (0.121) (0.141)
P(βII < 0) 0.011∗ 0.082+ 0.001∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.005∗∗
Mean GI 0.863 0.833 0.895 0.889 0.807
R-squared 0.299 0.250 0.370 0.296 0.309
Observations 91 48 43 58 33
B. High RA participants with low RA peer
βˆII -0.034 0.009 -0.103 -0.016 -0.069
(0.052) (0.045) (0.065) (0.066) (0.049)
P(βII < 0) 0.260 0.416 0.076+ 0.403 0.138
Mean GI 0.912 0.935 0.893 0.890 0.953
R-squared 0.004 0.029 0.034 0.001 0.019
Observations 164 77 87 105 59
C. High RA participants with only high RA peers
βˆII -0.062 -0.053 -0.067 -0.086 -0.028
(0.017) (0.036) (0.004) (0.01) (0.027)
P(βII < 0) 0.086+ 0.206 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.266
Mean GI 0.993 0.987 0.996 0.989 1.000
R-squared 0.084 0.077 0.084 0.115 0.056
Observations 100 40 60 65 35
+ p < .1, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01. First line: OLS estimates. Second line: standard errors are
clustered by session. Third line: one-sided t-percentile, based on wild cluster-bootstrap with
999 replications. All equations control for a participant’s number of low RA peers. Difference
II: Estimate of βII in Equation (12).
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Table 6: Demand for insurance by number of low RA peers
Low RA High RA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Round 2 Rounds 2-6 Round 2 Rounds 2-6
Individual Insurance (δˆII) -0.320 -0.282 -0.028 -0.047
(0.164) (0.121) (0.046) (0.046)
P(δII < 0) 0.073+ 0.038∗ 0.259 0.197
II x Nr. low RA peers (ηˆ) -0.200 -0.146 -0.004 -0.004
(0.104) (0.046) (0.059) (0.047)
P(η < 0) 0.027∗ 0.014∗ 0.484 0.469
Mean GI 0.865 0.871 0.937 0.941
N 89 89 256 256
R-squared 0.329 0.299 0.010 0.025
+ p < .1, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01. First line: OLS estimates. Second line: standard errors
clustered by session. Third line: one-sided t-percentile, based on a wild cluster-bootstrap
with 999 replications. All estimates control for the number of low RA peers.
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Table 7: Other outcomes: Enrollment, default and profits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Low RA High RA, High RAA. Proportion of rounds willing to join LRA peer only
βˆII -0.152 -0.433 -0.034 -0.062
(0.050) (0.112) (0.052) (0.017)
P(βII < 0) 0.010∗ 0.020∗ 0.580 0.172
Mean GI 0.927 0.863 0.912 0.993
R-squared 0.194 0.299 0.004 0.084
B. The insurer: Proportion of rounds enrolled
βˆII 0.032 -0.317 0.174 -0.033
(0.056) (0.121) (0.078) (0.026)
P(βII < 0) 0.460 0.056+ 0.054+ 0.311
Mean GI 0.804 0.740 0.709 0.964
R-squared 0.106 0.139 0.058 0.020
C. The MFI: Default probability averaged over rounds
βˆII -0.022 -0.020 -0.045 -0.008
(0.012) (0.021) (0.019) (0.005)
P(βII < 0) 0.116 0.450 0.058+ 0.154
Mean GI 0.051 0.068 0.077 0.009
R-squared 0.095 0.019 0.080 0.059
D. The client: Expected profits averaged over rounds
βˆII -0.004 0.245 -0.141 -0.004
(0.008) (0.060) (0.031) (0.003)
P(βII < 0) 0.716 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.292
Mean GI 1.029 1.038 1.043 1.005
R-squared 0.149 0.353 0.154 0.001
E. The client: Variance of profits averaged over rounds
βˆII 0.084 0.275 -0.055 0.066
(0.054) (0.102) (0.072) (0.028)
P(βII < 0) 0.104 0.048∗ 0.514 0.222
Mean GI 0.168 0.223 0.249 0.031
R-squared 0.117 0.149 0.010 0.115
Observations 355 91 164 100
+ p < .1, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01. βˆII : OLS estimates. Second line: std. errors in parentheses clustered
by session. Third line: one-sided t-percentile, based on a wild cluster-bootstrap with 999 replications.
All estimates control for the number of low RA peers. Columns (2)-(4) in Panel A come from Table 3.
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A Proofs
PROOF LEMMA 1
Proof By Definition (4), utility under full enrollment within a round satisfies:
U(e − ph; θi) ≥ (1 − p)U(e; θi) ∀ θi ≥ θ∗ (14)
Utility under zero enrollment within a round satisfies:
(1 − p) E U(e − c(Ft, e); θi) < (1 − p)U(e; θi) (15)
since c(Ft, e) > 0 for any Ft > 0.
By (14) and (15), full enrollment creates higher utility than zero enrollment within a round for
high RA clients with θi ≥ θ∗. Full enrollment in insurance also ensures that the group can repay
and is hence associated with a higher probability of continuation (with certainty) to the next round,
Pn = 1 > P0. Full enrollment hence creates higher discounted future expected utility compared
to zero enrollment, also if generalized to an infinite number of periods in which group members
coordinate on either always full enrollment or always zero enrollment. Thus, if θi ≥ θ∗,
V(FE; θi) > V(ZE; θi)
PROOF LEMMA 2
Proof Assume that one group member remains uninsured. Since the group can repay for at least
one group member by Condition (9), the n − 1 insured group members secure continuation to the
next round. Total expected group payoff within a round is:
(n − 1)(e − ph) + (1 − p)e − p(h − e) = n(e − ph) (16)
The n − 1 insured group members earn e − ph each. The uninsured client earns e with probability
1 − p and loses h − e with probability p.23
In general, whenever d ∈ DC such that nIt insured group members are able to repay the full
group loan, nIt (e − ph) ≥ (n − nIt )(h − e), expected payoff in the group is n(e − ph). Total payoff
in this case is a mean-preserving spread of the joint payoff in the full enrollment case, which is
n(e − ph) with certainty. Given the assumption of concave utility, Jensen’s inequality implies:∑
i
Vt(FE; θi) >
∑
i
Vt(d; θi) ∀ d ∈ DC
23If l represents the size of the loan, the ill client earns e+ l, pays health expenditures h, repays any remaining earnings,
e + l − h, and the group contributes the remainder. As a result, the net payment by other group members is h − e.
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PROOF THEOREM 1
Proof First, we prove the first part of the theorem,
d∗II(n − 1, θi) =
1 ∀ θi ≥ θ
∗
0 ∀ θi < θ∗
By Condition (9), if client i believes that all her group members will enroll, her value if she enrolls
is equal to:
U(e − ph; θi) + βV(FE; θi) (17)
An insured individual earns e with certainty, pays the insurance premium ph in the present loan
cycle and continues to the next loan cycle.
If she does not enroll, her value is equal to:
(1 − p)U(e; θi) + βV(FE; θi) (18)
She earns e with probability 1 − p, risks earning 0 with probability p and continues to the next
loan cycle with certainty.
The utility difference between di = 1 and di = 0 is:
U(e − ph; θi) − (1 − p)U(e; θi) ≥ 0⇔ θi ≥ θ∗ (19)
by Definition (4). An individual will take insurance if and only if θi ≥ θ∗. This shows the first part
of the theorem.
Under Condition (7), the best response to nobody enrolling is d∗II(0, θi) = 0 ∀ θi ∈ Θ as
discussed in the text. Always Zero Enrollment, ZE, is therefore a Nash equilibrium.
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B Experimental script
This appendix provides the most important elements of the instructions back-translated from
Kiswahili.
Game 1: Individual liability and individual insurance
Introduction The game starts as follows: You are one of five members of a microcredit group.
Assume that you are borrowing 40,000 Shillings from a bank every month for your business to
make a profit. Your profit is 22,500 Shillings. If you are able to repay the loan, you will repay it.
In that case you can borrow a second time so then you will play this game twice. If you do not
repay the loan you will, you will not be able to play again.
Health problems Before you repay your loan, two things may happen: you may get sick or you
may not. If you are healthy, you will be able to repay the 40,000 shilling debt to the bank. A
research assistant will put a profit of 22,500 shillings in your piggybank. Since you repay your
loan, the bank is allowing you to borrow again.
But if you are sick, you will need to use your full income on treatment. Therefore, you pay
a research assistant your 62,500 shillings and your profit will be 0. It means that you will not be
able to repay the loan. The bank will not lend you money again and hence you will not be able to
play this game again. You will be able to borrow again from the bank and get money again only
when a new game starts. It is important that you know you will not be able to open the piggybank
when the game is in play. Therefore, you cannot use the money from the piggybank to repay your
debt.
To know if you are sick or not, the research assistant will tell you to take a card from an
envelope. There are 5 cards in the envelope. Four (4) of the cards have no writings on them and
one card has a picture of a doctor. If you get the card with a picture, you are sick. You are supposed
to take a card while you are not looking at it. After you get the card, look at it and then put it back
into the envelope. Another person should do the same so that every person has the same chance to
be sick.
Health insurance You can get a health insurance policy every time you play this game. It costs
12,500 shillings. With health insurance you will not be required to pay for medical expenses if
you get sick. Therefore you will be able to repay the bank loan of 40,000 shillings. Your profit is
always 10,000 shillings. The research assistant will put this profit in the piggybank. The bank will
allow you to borrow again.
If you do not have health insurance, you will not pay 12,500 shillings for the insurance policy.
If you are not sick, you will pay the loan and your profit will be 22,500 shillings. If you are sick,
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you will loose all your income and you will not be able to repay the loan, your profit will be 0 and
you will not play in this round again. You will only be able to borrow from the bank again and get
money in a new game.
The insurance will be used only for one round. You can decide if you want to pay for the
health insurance policy or not in every round of the game.
A test game was played in public.
The group score board The research assistant will show you whether your group members man-
aged to pay or not. The research assistant will do this after every round. Every member in your
group is represented by a symbol: square, moon, circle, triangle and a star. The research assistant
will put the symbol on the board.
A group member’s profit is 22,500 shillings if the member did not pay for health insurance
and is not sick in this round. A group member’s profit is 0 shillings and he or she will not continue
to play the game in future rounds if the member did not pay for health insurance and is sick. A
group member’s profit is 10,000 shillings if the member paid for health insurance and either got
sick or not. All members who are on the green line can pay and hence can continue to play the
game in future rounds. All group members who are on the red line cannot repay and will not
continue to play the game.
Please remember that you can not talk to anybody when the game is in play. Your group
members do not know your symbol and hence are unaware of your decisions.
From this point onward, the plastic money you will win will be converted to real money. You
will get paid in cash the money in the piggybank at the end of this game. You will get paid 1,000
shillings in real money for every 10,000 shillings in plastic money in the bank.
Game 2: Joint liability and group insurance24
The second game looks like the first one. The cost of health insurance is 12,500 shillings. The
difference with the first game is that the decision on enrolling in health insurance must be made
by the whole group, not individually. The other difference is that now the loan from the bank is
taken as a group and the loan is to be paid by the whole group in full. The bank will only allow
the group to borrow again if the group will repay the entire loan. The game will be over for the
whole group if the group fails to repay the full loan.
So first, in this game, you vote to decide if you want the group to have a health insurance
policy or not. The policy will be paid if the whole group votes in favor of health insurance. If
at least one member of the group votes not to get insurance, the whole group will go without
24Instructions for individual insurance treatments are similar to the instructions for group insurance but exclude the
information on unanimity voting. Available upon request.
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insurance and you will not pay the premium. You will vote on this card saying whether you want
to get the policy or not. Circle the symbol on the left marked with a cross if you want to buy the
policy. Circle the symbol on the right marked with a cross with a line passing through it if you do
not want to pay for the insurance policy.
The other difference with the previous game is that now the whole group is required to pay
the loan in full and together. Therefore, those who cannot cover their share of the loan should get
assistance from their fellow group members. How much assistance will be required depends on
how many group members fail to repay their share of the loan.
If all five members of the group can repay their loan, each member will pay 40,000 shillings.
All five members of the group will advance to the next round. If four group members can repay
their loan and one fails, each of those four will repay their loan of 40,000 shillings and will assist
the one who failed with 10,000 shillings each. All group members will advance to the next round
including the one who failed to meet his or her responsibility. If less than four people can repay
their share, meaning that two or more group members fail to repay, then the group will not be able
to repay in full. The game will end for all group members. Those who are able to repay their
40,000 shilling loan do so and spend the rest of their profits to help defaulting group members.
Their final profit in this round is 0. Thus, each group is required to have four or more members
who can repay to advance to the next round of the game.
Treatments without communication Please remember that you can not talk to anybody when the
game is in play. Your group members do not know your symbol and hence are unaware of your
decisions.
Treatments with communication Please remember that it is not allowed to communicate with
anyone while the game is in play. But before each round begins, you are allowed to communicate
with your fellow credit group members about the insurance policy. You may communicate with
them for two minutes. Communication will not be allowed after these two minutes. Your group
members do not know your symbol and hence are unaware of your decisions.
Number of rounds in the game We will play this game for several rounds. We are not certain
how many rounds. If you do not drop out of the game, you will be able to play at least four times.
From the fourth round onwards, we will toss a die after every round. The game will continue if
the die lands at number 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. The game will stop for everybody in the group if the die
settles on number 1.
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